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Neuroscience and the Personalization of
Criminal Law
Deborah W. Denno†
While objective standards of reasonableness permeate most legal disciplines,
criminal law has trended toward personalization since the 1960s, when the Model
Penal Code introduced conceptions of mental states based on Freudian psychoana-
lytic theory. Today, advancements in neuroscience offer previously inconceivable in-
sights into living brain structures and damage. This Essay contends that a criminal
justice system that uses personalizing neuroscientific evidence will yield better out-
comes. This Essay contributes two unique tools to the personalized law debate. First
are the results of my two-decade-long Neuroscience Study, in which I have compiled
eight hundred criminal cases that addressed neuroscientific evidence in any capac-
ity. The data gathered from these cases suggest that simplistic views that regard
neuroscience as either entirely exculpatory or solely indicative of future dangerous-
ness are misinformed. Second, this Essay posits a probabilistic theory of analyzing
evidence based on Bayes’s Theorem. Bayes’s Theorem offers a compelling model of
human reasoning that comports with the process of assessing a defendant’s culpa-
bility in legal settings. Neuroscientific evidence can thus be understood as a means
of modifying initial beliefs and mitigating implicit biases in criminal contexts. Em-
ploying these tools, I analyze the impact of personalized evidence on criminal de-
fenses, which I argue are strongly motivated by probabilistic determinations of a
defendant’s culpability. These determinations have significant impacts beyond
individual cases and can contribute to trends in litigation funding. This Essay
systematically argues that personalization, fueled by neuroscientific evidence,
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can provide gains in fairness and efficiency, especially when admitted in the con-
text of criminal defenses, due to their emphasis on probabilistic determinations
of culpability.
INTRODUCTION
Every criminal case is part of a larger personal story—some
headline-grabbing, some entirely mundane; yet each narrative is
important to how the criminal justice system assesses an individ-
ual’s level of culpability. People v Jones1 is one such story: Willie
Jones, a seemingly prototypical defendant, exhibited a level of
brain trauma that was anything but ordinary.
In 1991, after Jones paid Martha Drumgoole $15 to have sex with
him in his home, Drumgoole’s lover, Brenda Hardaway, attempted to
enter by breaking a window.2 Believing that Hardaway was either try-
ing to hurt him or burgle his house, Jones shot her seven times,
killing her.3 While the intoxicated Hardaway had a reputation for
violence, she seemingly did little at the time to suggest she would
either burgle or kill anyone.4
Despite this seeming lack of basis, Jones presented a claim of
self-defense, contending that he reasonably believed Hardaway was
dangerous because he suffered from a gross cognitive impairment
that impeded his ability to form intent, process information, and
respond appropriately.5 Because of his brain damage, Jones ar-
gued he believed his life was in danger even though a person with-
out brain damage may not have perceived the situation similarly.6
Indeed, early neurological testing indicated that Jones’s mental
impairment was so deleterious that his medical experts wanted
additional tests to validate and explore his condition—specifi-
cally, tests with modern brain imaging devices that could reveal
the nature and extent of Jones’s injury.7 In addition, Jones
wanted these experts to explain to the jury the extent to which
his mental disabilities impacted his behavior.8
1 210 AD2d 904 (NY App 1994).
2 Brief for Respondent, People v Jones, No 1578, *1–2 (NY App filed Oct 20, 1994)
(Respondent’s Brief).
3 Brief for Appellant, People v Jones, No 1578, *20 (NY App filed Oct 20, 1994)
(Appellant’s Brief).
4 See Respondent’s Brief at *2 (cited in note 2).
5 Appellant’s Brief at *12 (cited in note 3).
6 Respondent’s Brief at *12 (cited in note 2).
7 Id at *3; Appellant’s Brief at *2 (cited in note 3).
8 Respondent’s Brief at *7 (cited in note 2).
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The trial court denied Jones’s requests, ruling that the de-
fense failed to show the medical reasons for such testing and that
the doctors could not testify about the link between Jones’s con-
dition and his behavior.9 A jury convicted Jones of second-degree
murder, and he was sentenced to fifteen years to life in prison.10
Yet the defense appealed the trial court’s decision, and the appel-
late court reversed, concluding that the trial court had abused its
discretion by excluding evidence.11 According to the appellate
court, the testing and accompanying expert testimony were “cru-
cial” for Jones’s defense because understanding the impact of
Jones’s brain damage on his behavior and ability to form intent
was “outside the ken” of the average juror.12 The test results and
doctors’ explanations could help establish that Jones could not
have achieved the level of intent necessary to justify a murder
charge and that manslaughter more accurately reflected his men-
tal state.13 Rather than risk losing the case on retrial, Jones and
prosecutors agreed to a plea bargain that lowered the murder
charge to first-degree manslaughter, which carried a sentence of
six to eighteen years in prison.14
The courts and defense experts in Jones were harbingers of
more cases involving neuroscientific evidence and brain trauma.
The last thirty years have seen a surge of research in neurosci-
ence, “the branch of life sciences that studies the brain and nerv-
ous systems.”15 Innovations such as Magnetic Resonance Imaging
(MRI) have enabled researchers to examine living brains—the
most personalized and intimate “of all human experiences”—in a
way that no previous technology allowed.16 This neuroscientific
research has the potential to revise society’s concept of human
nature and how the law can handle dangerous criminal behavior.
Such a newly constructed perspective is important to criminal law
9 Appellant’s Brief at *6, *14 (cited in note 3).
10 Id at *1.
11 Id; Jones, 210 AD2d at 904.
12 Jones, 210 AD2d at 904.
13 Id at 904–05.
14 Id.
15 Brent Garland, Neuroscience and the Law: Brain, Mind, and the Scales of Justice 206
(Dana 2004). See generally Owen D. Jones and Francis X. Shen, Law and Neuroscience in the
United States, in Tade Matthias Spranger, ed, International Neurolaw 349 (Springer 2012)
(providing an overview of neuroscience in many different fields of law).
16 Marc Jonathan Blitz, Searching Minds by Scanning Brains: Neuroscience
Technology and Constitutional Privacy Protection 2 (Palgrave Macmillan 2017).
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because key concepts of culpability depend on assessing the inter-
nal workings of individuals’ minds.17
This Essay presents five major arguments for incorporating
a more personalized approach in criminal law.18 First, a criminal
justice system that is more personalized or subjective would likely
be more effective, efficient, and fair. Typically the legal system
does not reflect people’s particular characteristics, traits, and cir-
cumstances. In other words, most law is impersonal. Yet in 1962,
the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code (MPC) advocated
a more subjective approach to criminal law given criminal law’s
focus on defendants’ mental states. The MPC also recognized that
the rapid growth in the psychological sciences was revealing in-
creasingly relevant information about how all individuals think
and reason. The MPC considered these scientific trends im-
portant because they would enable a more refined and accurate
conception of a defendant’s level of culpability and blameworthi-
ness, therefore establishing fairer and more effective means of
punishing, rehabilitating, or deterring such individuals. The im-
portance of psychological science was especially emphasized in
the context of criminal law defenses.19
This Essay’s second argument is that neuroscience is a par-
ticularly valuable form of personalized evidence, especially when
it is used to evaluate a defendant’s level of mental culpability.
Until the 1970s, for example, substantial portions of criminal law
doctrine reflected a Freudian psychoanalytic conception of a de-
fendant’s mental state, not the modern neuroscientific under-
standing.20 While both the psychoanalytic and neuroscientific ap-
proaches emphasize personalization, I argue that neuroscience
better reflects both individual and group criminal behavior.21
Third, the greater influx of personalization using neurosci-
ence combats the simplistic and exaggerated perception that the
criminal justice system handles defendants in a dichotomous,
17 See Deborah W. Denno, Crime and Consciousness: Science and Involuntary Acts,
87 Minn L Rev 269, 275–76 (2002).
18 For examples of discussions of personalization in other areas of the law, see generally
Philip Hacker and Bilyana Petkova, Reining in the Big Promise of Big Data: Transparency,
Inequality, and New Regulatory Frontiers, 15 Nw J Tech & Intell Prop 1 (2017); Omri Ben-
Shahar and Ariel Porat, Personalizing Negligence Law, 91 NYU L Rev 627 (2016); Ariel Porat
and Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure with Big Data, 112
Mich L Rev 1417 (2014).
19 See notes 32–33 and accompanying text.
20 See Deborah W. Denno, Criminal Law in a Post-Freudian World, 2005 U Ill L Rev
601, 657, 660.
21 Id at 682.
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all-or-nothing manner when neuroscientific evidence is intro-
duced. Specifically, this influx will counter the notion that the ev-
idence will either be entirely exculpatory or entirely condemna-
tory for defendants. My research and that of others generally
show that neuroscientific evidence offers factfinders additional
information about defendants that is more precise, reliable, and
granular than what criminal cases have previously provided by
way of psychiatric testimony and that courts embrace neurosci-
entific evidence for this purpose. Indeed, in death penalty cases,
the Supreme Court has perceived neuroscientific evidence to be
so significant for mitigation that this emphasis has bolstered the
defense’s ability to win claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
if trial attorneys failed to introduce such evidence when it was
relevant or if the attorneys mishandled the evidence even if they
did introduce it.22
Overall, the criminal justice system values personalization
despite the overreactive and dichotomous view that some critics
point to when weighing neuroscientific evidence. Therefore, my
Essay proposes a fourth argument. It advocates a more accurate
approach to personalization—one based on a probabilistic frame-
work, which is also “personalistic.”23 With a “personalistic defini-
tion of probability different people may have different ideas about
the probability of the same event,” therefore producing different
expected outcomes.24 Yet such variability should not be of concern
to the criminal justice system because it would be anticipated in
circumstances “where the evidence is ambiguous and subject to
differing interpretations.”25 Not only does a probabilistic approach
get us closer to personalization, but it also gets us closer to the
truth by helping us better assess neuroscientific data in the prag-
matic context of how the legal system operates. Probabilities also
help us to withstand dichotomous thinking because they reflect a
matter of degree as opposed to an all-or-nothing framework. This
Essay’s fifth argument focuses on criminal law defenses because
they rely most heavily on a highly personalized view of a defend-
ant. A probabilistic framework helps diminish critics’ concerns
22 See Deborah W. Denno, The Myth of the Double-Edged Sword: An Empirical Study
of Neuroscience Evidence in Criminal Cases, 56 BC L Rev 493, 505–06 & n 74 (2015).
23 John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 Stan L Rev 1065,
1067 (1968).
24 Id at 1067, 1069.
25 Id at 1067.
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over such personalization because of its emphasis on degrees ra-
ther than dichotomies.26
A probabilistic approach also fits within the legal and scien-
tific parameters of the criminal justice system. For example, we
ask judges, juries, prosecutors, and defense attorneys to make
probabilistic determinations all the time. Standards like beyond
a reasonable doubt, preponderance of the evidence, and prejudi-
cial versus probative are all configured in a probabilistic frame-
work. In addition, science generally—and neuroscience specifi-
cally—are probabilistic tools in that they try to determine the
importance or effect of one variable against another or to fulfill a
particular statistical standard. Lastly, there is increasing evi-
dence that people themselves inherently think probabilistically.
From an early age, our brains search for statistics and combine
them with other information in order to make decisions.27
This Essay contends that Bayes’s Theorem, one type of
probability analysis, is particularly fitting for these calculations
because it is designed to detect gradations that may otherwise
be perceived in terms of dichotomous extremes. In essence, the
Theorem is an elementary mathematical formula based on a law
of probability that guides us to revise or update our initial beliefs
about a proposition based on new and objective information. Such
updating provides us with a more accurate, more advanced, and
better belief.28 The Bayes approach can help explain why neuro-
scientific evidence can be a means of revising and improving a
factfinder’s initial beliefs about a defendant’s level of mental
culpability.
The use of Bayes’s Theorem raises a number of key questions,
however. If there is evidence that people inherently think proba-
bilistically, that key legal standards (such as beyond a reasonable
doubt) are probabilistic, and that neuroscience is probabilistic,
26 See id at 1070 (explaining that, because “probability and utility are personalistic
concepts, the differences [in attempting to quantify them] are mostly of degree rather than
kind”).
27 See notes 69, 82, 85 and accompanying text.
28 See Sharon Bertsch McGrayne, The Theory That Would Not Die: How Bayes’ Rule
Cracked the Enigma Code, Hunted Down Russian Submarines, and Emerged Triumphant
from Two Centuries of Controversy ix (Yale 2011). For a fuller description and discussion
of the Theorem’s more modern usages, see Nate Silver, The Signal and the Noise: Why So
Many Predictions Fail—but Some Don’t 242–61 (Penguin 2012) (noting that Bayes’s
Theorem is a probabilistic process that reveals the conditional likelihood that a hypothesis
is true provided that another event occurs).
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why do we even need a Bayesian framework? The answer is be-
cause we do not always conduct probabilistic calculations very
well; we need some guidance to help us make better decisions. For
example, we have implicit biases that make us overvalue some
factors—such as race or physical attractiveness—that should be
irrelevant in determining a defendant’s guilt or a particular pun-
ishment. But we also have biases that make us undervalue cer-
tain factors—such as neuroimaging evidence—because we do not
think it is important (as the trial judge thought in Jones) or we
think it can bode poorly for the defendant (by heightening the
likelihood that a juror may view the defendant as a possible fu-
ture danger to others and therefore a strong contender for deserv-
ing the death penalty).
It is also critical to consider who is making these Bayesian
decisions. Depending on the case, it could be any or all of the key
legal actors and some at the same time. In the Jones trial, the
judge was the first decisionmaker, followed by the jury; but after
the appeal, the prosecution was the probabilistic decisionmaker
in offering a plea bargain, and the defense had to weigh the odds
and decide whether to take the deal. In other words, the prosecu-
tor updated his view of the case based on new evidence that he
believed could have a substantial impact in a new trial with another
jury. He thought a plea bargain would sidestep the risk that he
could lose a retrial entirely if the additional testing was introduced.
In essence, a Bayesian framework shows how decisionmakers—
whoever they are—start at the baseline and process new data. I
argue that the criminal justice system could be more effective,
more efficient, and fairer if some of those new data included rele-
vant, personalized information about the defendant. A Bayesian
analysis would help that approach along. It would get us closer to
the truth and a more accurate assessment of how to treat a crim-
inal defendant.
The purpose of this Essay is to demonstrate the use of a prob-
abilistic and personalized approach in the criminal justice sys-
tem’s consideration of neuroscientific evidence in four types of
criminal law defenses: lesser mens rea, insanity, diminished ca-
pacity, and incompetence. The analysis draws on an original da-
tabase that I created consisting of every criminal case that has
addressed neuroscientific evidence in any capacity over the course
of two decades (totaling eight hundred cases). This analysis thus
provides a new statistical and informational method to address
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the false dichotomy that such evidence is thought to present, and
it uses Bayes’s Theorem as part of a normative explanation.
Part I discusses why a personalized approach is important to
criminal law. It also describes the “Neuroscience Study,” its ini-
tial results, and how such research can be used to provide appro-
priate data for probabilistic assessments. Part II analyzes the
reasons for applying a Bayesian approach to examine neuroscien-
tific evidence in the context of defenses and employs the Jones
case as an example. Part III examines four key criminal defenses
under a Bayesian approach and how such a perspective can
heighten the value and impact of personalization. Part IV ends
with an emphasis on the importance of a personalistic use of prob-
abilistic decision-making in the criminal justice system, espe-
cially when evaluating neuroscientific evidence. The discussion
also incorporates an evaluation of funding concerns in cases when
defendants are requesting the use of certain types of neuroscien-
tific testing and experts, given objections that such sophisticated
mitigation tools may not be fully available to all defendants. This
focus on available funding further explains how personalization
connects to probability and why employing both together makes
the criminal justice system more efficient and fairer.
I. WHAT PERSONALIZATION MEANS IN CRIMINAL LAW
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes espoused the classic perspec-
tive that the law disregards personalization and subjectivity—
namely “the infinite varieties of temperament, intellect, and edu-
cation which make the internal character of a given act so differ-
ent in different men.”29 While Holmes’s statement characterizes a
number of legal doctrines, including the objective “reasonable per-
son” standard of negligence in tort law,30 such a generalization
about personalization and subjectivity is substantially less clear
in criminal law. For example, there is heated disagreement about
whether negligent acts should even be eligible for criminal pun-
ishment, much less whether the criminal law should have greater
or lesser degrees of subjectivity. Indeed, the nature of the
objective/subjective balance often varies according to the types of
criminal law doctrines or defenses at issue.
29 Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr,TheCommonLaw 108 (Little, Brown, and Company 1881).
30 See Ben-Shahar and Porat, 91 NYU L Rev at 628–29 (cited in note 18).
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This objective/subjective debate is also influenced by what
philosophy of punishment an individual embraces. Those who ad-
vocate a retributive or just deserts model of punishment may be
less concerned about evaluating a defendant’s personal character-
istics or experiences than those who embrace a rehabilitative
model, in which individual differences can be highly influential.31
The members of the American Law Institute were primarily
motivated by a theory of rehabilitation when, in 1962, the organ-
ization published its Proposed Official Draft of the MPC—the
product of a decade-long effort at revising penal codes throughout
the country. The MPC has been hugely influential throughout the
country and has been persuasive authority in thousands of court
opinions.32 But it was the MPC’s emphasis on incorporating the
psychological sciences of the times into its provisions that was
such a major component of its power to reform. That science was
largely Freudian psychoanalysis and a concomitant emphasis on
individual experiences and mental processes. While modern
American psychiatry experienced a paradigm shift in the mid-
1970s toward biological psychiatry, the curve toward subjectivity
and the use of brain sciences remained in criminal law.33
Of course, not all states embraced the MPC. And the punitive
bent of the 1990s has fueled further tensions between objectivity
and subjectivity depending on what theory of punishment one
holds. That said, a firm place for subjectivity remains in the crim-
inal law, and the surge of interest in and research on neuroscience
has been used to support subjectivity. The following Sections de-
scribe my Neuroscience Study and the kinds of highly personal-
ized data it has collected.
A. The Neuroscience Study
The Neuroscience Study—a large-scale empirical research
project—offers an unprecedented opportunity to consider how
neuroscientific evidence fits into a legal framework from multiple
and diverse perspectives, particularly personalization. I collected
31 See Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law 129 (Carolina Academic 2018).
32 See Paul H. Robinson and Markus D. Dubber, The American Model Penal Code: A
Brief Overview, 10 New Crim L Rev 319, 326–27 (2007) (“Thousands of court opinions have
cited the Model Penal Code as persuasive authority for the interpretation of an existing
statute or in the exercise of a court’s occasional power to formulate a criminal law doctrine.”);
Denno, 2005 U Ill L Rev at 694–95, 698–744 (cited in note 20) (reviewing all standard jury
instructions for mens rea in all fifty states, many of which show the MPC’s influence).
33 See Denno, 2005 U Ill L Rev at 614–15 (cited in note 20).
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any criminal law case that addressed neuroscientific evidence in
any capacity from January 1, 1992, to December 31, 2012, using
the Westlaw and Lexis legal databases. These cases, which to-
taled 800, produced over 150 key factors relevant to the criminal
justice system; they were coded primarily by trained law school
graduates who also spot-checked and reviewed one another. The
case selection and coding techniques employed for the Neuroscience
Study have been described in detail elsewhere, along with the
strengths (reliability and validity) and drawbacks (underinclu-
sion) of using only Westlaw and Lexis databases.34
1. Overview.
The Neuroscience Study’s 800 cases fall into three categories:
247 cases (30.88 percent) concern neuroscientific evidence as it
pertains to the victim, primarily to prove the extent of a victim’s
brain injury; 514 cases (64.25 percent) concern neuroscientific ev-
idence as it pertains to the defendant; and 39 cases (4.88 percent)
concern neuroscientific evidence as it pertains to both the defend-
ant and the victim because the brains of one or more individuals
in both the “victim” and “defendant” categories were examined.35
Because this Essay’s major focus is criminal defenses, only the
latter two categories—“defendant” and “both victim and defend-
ant”—are relevant, totaling 553 cases.
The Neuroscience Study’s operational definition of the term
“neuroscience” is the investigation of the brain and nervous sys-
tem based on both imaging tests (such as the MRI) and nonimag-
ing standardized tests (such as the Wechsler test).36 Overall, the
majority of the Neuroscience Study’s cases involve defendants
convicted of murder or a serious crime, of which a substantial por-
tion (about two-thirds) began as capital cases even if the defend-
ants’ sentences were later reduced to noncapital sentences. In ad-
dition, noncapital defendants faced long prison sentences of at
least a decade or more. Generally, it appears that neuroscientific
evidence is used in cases in which defendants face the death pen-
alty, a life sentence, or a decades-long prison sentence—perhaps
because the stakes are higher and there is substantially greater
time and funding spent on the defense. Lastly, the Neuroscience
Study has also revealed that neuroscientific evidence is employed
34 Denno, 56 BC L Rev at 500–01 (cited in note 22).
35 Id at 501.
36 Id at 504–05.
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at different stages of cases, suggesting that in either a capital case
or a noncapital case, neuroscience may be incorporated during the
guilt determination phase, the penalty phase, or both.37
2. Defendants.
In terms of personalizing defendants, the types of testing se-
lected are significant. MRI tests and computerized tomography
(CT) scans are the most widely employed types, and most testing
is used by defense attorneys to support arguments that defend-
ants suffered from cognitive deficiencies that impacted their men-
tal state.38 Thus, defendants’ arguments pertain to a range of de-
fenses—diminished capacity, insanity, incompetency, or the lack
of mens rea necessary to complete the crime.39 Different testing
methods can reveal disorders that are relevant to such defenses,
including brain damage, mental deficiency, mental illness, and
brain abnormality.40
Typically, few claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are
successful; yet in the Neuroscience Study, a relatively higher
number of cases involve claims that defense attorneys were inef-
fective because they failed to present neuroscientific evidence.41
As I have discussed previously, claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel are enhanced when they include arguments that attor-
neys either failed to introduce neuroscientific evidence or did so
irresponsibly.42 Contentions that defendants would be a future
danger were far rarer than commentators have assumed, suggest-
ing that neuroscientific evidence is presented more often by the de-
fense for purposes of mitigation than by the prosecution to show
that a defendant should be imprisoned for a long time or executed.43
B. The Neuroscience Study’s Personalized Defenses
The Neuroscience Study shows that neuroscientific evidence
is generally raised in cases in which defendants are facing severe
sentences. My prior research has also demonstrated that such ev-
idence is most commonly introduced for an important yet
relatively conventional purpose: as part of an effort to mitigate a
37 Id at 502.
38 Denno, 56 BC L Rev at 548 (cited in note 22).
39 See Part III.
40 See Appendix, Figures 2–4.
41 See note 22 and accompanying text.
42 Id.
43 Id.
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defendant’s sentence.44 Indeed, the Neuroscience Study has re-
vealed a criminal justice system that is willing to embrace inno-
vative methods of assessing defendants’ mental capabilities and
expects its attorneys to do the same, as evidenced by courts grant-
ing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.45 Thus, the greater
personalization that such information affords appears to impact
how the criminal justice system metes out punishments, espe-
cially in the direction of mitigation.
This Essay analyzes how defendants construct personalized
defenses, especially those that most readily comport with neuro-
scientific evidence: lesser mens rea, insanity, incompetency, and
diminished capacity. The discussion that follows focuses on the
nature and extent to which attorneys attempt to personalize their
clients’ defenses by relying on probabilistic strategies, particu-
larly those resembling Bayes’s Theorem. This probabilistic frame-
work also reflects the broad principles underlying a Bayesian ap-
proach to understanding the brain and behavior.46
II. THE VALUE OF A BAYESIAN APPROACH
Critics of a more personalized framework in criminal law47
contend that judges and juries either find neuroscientific evidence
confusing or view it simplistically as a double-edged sword48—
that is, as a vehicle that can absolve a defendant’s responsibility
for the crime entirely or provide support that the defendant will
be a danger to others in the future and therefore deserving of a
long prison sentence or even the death penalty. However, a rigor-
ous review of the data tells a different story. My research has
shown that such all-or-nothing assumptions ignore both the com-
plexity of the many legal doctrines that rely on neuroscientific ev-
idence as well as the range of brain injuries that can influence
perceptions of a defendant’s level of culpability.49 Likewise, there
44 Denno, 56 BC L Rev at 503 (cited in note 22).
45 Id at 514–25.
46 See generally Konrad Paul Kording, Bayesian Statistics: Relevant for the Brain?,
25 Current Op in Neurobiology 130 (2014); Jill X. O’Reilly, Saad Jbabdi, and Timothy E.
J. Behrens, How Can a Bayesian Approach Inform Neuroscience?, 35 Eur J Neuroscience
1169 (2012).
47 For a thorough discussion of critics on both sides of the debate over neuroscientific
evidence and personalization, see generally Peter A. Alces, The Moral Conflict of Law and
Neuroscience (Chicago 2018).
48 See Denno, 56 BC L Rev at 496–97, 529–31 (cited in note 22).
49 See generally Deborah W. Denno, Concocting Criminal Intent, 105 Georgetown L
J 323 (2017); Deborah W. Denno, How Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys Differ in Their
Use of Neuroscientific Evidence, 85 Fordham L Rev 453 (2016); Deborah W. Denno, The
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is no evidence to demonstrate that case dispositions support such
dichotomous outcomes. While neuroscientific evidence can miti-
gate charges or a prison sentence, as the Jones case demonstrated,
in other cases its impact may be negligible or too remote to assess.
In addition, there is no indication that neuroscientific evidence
promotes longer incarceration or a death sentence for an inmate
except in particular circumstances.50
This Essay contends that a probabilistic approach is a more
accurate and realistic reflection of the legal system and also is
where the legal system should be going with regard to neurosci-
entific evidence. Such an approach also helps dispel dichotomous
thinking because probabilities involving multiple factors from a
Bayesian perspective can reflect changing viewpoints that incor-
porate a number of different types of personalized information.
A. Construct and Components
Proved initially by the Reverend Thomas Bayes, an
eighteenth-century statistician and Presbyterian minister,
Bayes’s Theorem asks how new information could change an in-
dividual’s degree of confidence in an initial belief.51 This practice,
also known as Bayesian updating, can be simply described as fol-
lows: “[B]y updating our initial belief about something with objec-
tive new information, we get a new and improved belief.”52 Over
time, labels were designated for each part of the Theorem: the
term “prior” represents the probability of the initial belief (P(A));
the term “objective new information” (or similar terminology) rep-
resents the probability of new information being introduced
(P(B)); the term “likelihood” represents the probability that there
would be other hypotheses in light of the introduction of objective
new information (P(B|A)); and the term “posterior” represents
the probability that an individual would construct an updated or
revised belief based on this objective new information (P(A|B)).53
This basic theorem is expressed formulaically as follows:
Place for Neuroscience in Criminal Law, in Dennis Patterson and Michael Pardo, eds,
Philosophical Foundations of Law and Neuroscience 69 (Oxford 2016); Denno, 56 BC L
Rev 493 (cited in note 22).
50 See Denno, 56 BC L Rev at 526–27 (cited in note 22).
51 See Richard Price, Preface to Thomas Bayes, An Essay towards Solving a Problem
in the Doctrine of Chances, 53 Phil Transactions Royal Society London 370, 371–72 (1763).
52 McGrayne, The Theory That Would Not Die at ix (cited in note 28). For a fuller
description and discussion of its more modern usages, see Silver, The Signal and the Noise
242–61 (cited in note 28).
53 McGrayne, The Theory That Would Not Die at 8 (cited in note 28).
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Typical nonlegal applications of Bayes’s Theorem often con-
cern estimating the probability of someone getting cancer. For ex-
ample, a woman in her forties who receives a positive mammo-
gram result may want to know the probability that she has breast
cancer. Under a Bayesian approach, she will try to acquire three
types of data: (1) the probability that a woman in her forties will
get breast cancer (1.4 percent); (2) the probability that the mam-
mogram will detect breast cancer in a forty-something woman
who actually has it (75 percent); and (3) the probability that any
random forty-something woman without cancer will have a posi-
tive mammogram (10 percent). According to Bayes’s Theorem, the
probability that the woman at issue has cancer in light of her pos-
itive mammogram is only about 11 percent, meaning that over
nine out of ten positive mammogram results for forty-something
women are false positives. The false positives stand out in a situ-
ation like this because very few forty-something women actually
get breast cancer.54
The Theorem and its derivations form the basis of the Bayesian
inference technique. The technique is known for its breadth and
the persistence of its applications across three centuries in a
variety of disciplines so neatly encapsulated in the title of
Sharon McGrayne’s book, The Theory That Would Not Die: How
Bayes’ Rule Cracked the Enigma Code, Hunted Down Russian
Submarines, and Emerged Triumphant from Two Centuries of
Controversy.55 In more recent decades, the Theorem has regained
its footing as a means of probabilistic analysis in such areas as cog-
nitive neuroscience, artificial intelligence, and financial modeling.56
Despite its range and longevity, however, the Bayesian ap-
proach has rarely been applied in the legal context.57 While there
54 Silver, The Signal and the Noise at 245 (cited in note 28). The Bayes’s Theorem
calculation goes as follows: ! " # = )(*|+)∙)(+))(*) = (,.,./)∙(,.01),.. = 0.105 ≈ 11%.
55 McGrayne, The Theory That Would Not Die (cited in note 28).
56 See generally id (detailing Bayes’s Theorem’s application since the time of its dis-
covery up to the present). See also Erica Klarreich, In Search of Bayesian Inference, 58
Communications of the ACM 21, 21–22 (2015) (reviewing the many ways Bayes’s Theorem
has been used); Silver, The Signal and the Noise at 242–61 (cited in note 28) (discussing
the many dimensions of Bayesian Theory).
57 Professor John Kaplan’s application appears to have been the first, closely fol-
lowed in time by Michael Finkelstein and Professor William Fairley’s article and then
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is disagreement on the validity of such an application, this Essay
uses the Theorem as a normative gauge and as a means of explo-
ration, essentially a method for weighing different kinds of evi-
dence in a criminal case even if that evidence cannot be measured
precisely. Indeed, one of the benefits of the Bayesian approach is
its applicability to uncertainty, particularly imprecise or esti-
mated information.58
B. Bayesian Updating
Consider how Bayesian updating would apply to the person-
alized information at issue in Jones and the prosecution’s decision
to plea bargain.59 Recall that Jones shot and killed Hardaway in
reaction to her attempted break-in.60 The defense argued that
Jones was brain damaged and further neurological testing and
neuroimaging were needed to show that his reaction in self-
defense was reasonable in light of his circumstances and gross
cognitive impairment.61 In addition, the defense argued that ex-
perts were necessary to explain to the jury how Jones’s disabili-
ties impacted his behavior.62 The trial court denied the defense’s
requests, and the jury convicted Jones of second degree murder.63
Jones successfully appealed.64 At this point, both the prosecution
and defense updated their view of the case based on this potential
introduction of new evidence. The prosecution in particular had
to recalculate and weigh how significant this new neuroimaging
evidence would be to a new jury’s decision-making about Jones’s
culpability. Rather than risk losing at a retrial because this
additional testing and expert testimony could be influential, the
prosecution agreed to a plea bargain, or a compromise. Jones
could plead to manslaughter in the first degree and shave years
Professor Laurence Tribe’s critique of Finkelstein and Fairley. See generally Michael O.
Finkelstein and William B. Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83
Harv L Rev 489 (1970); Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in
the Legal Process, 84 Harv L Rev 1329 (1971). Over the years, other articles have sporad-
ically followed these three starting pieces. See generally, for example, Richard Lempert,
The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing the Process of Proof, 66 BU L Rev 439 (1986).
58 See note 67 and accompanying text.
59 See text accompanying note 14.
60 Respondent’s Brief at *1–2 (cited in note 2).
61 Id at *12.
62 Id at *7.
63 Appellant’s Brief at *1 (cited in note 3).
64 Jones, 210 AD2d at 904.
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off the sentence he initially received.65 Presumably, the prosecu-
tion was concerned that the additional testing and a new trial
could change the initial outcome and result in Jones’s conviction
for something less than murder, and perhaps even produce an
acquittal. Such compromise solutions would be expected in
criminal cases that represent what could be considered a
Bayesian approach.66
As Table 1 of the Appendix shows, Bayes’s Theorem as ap-
plied to the Jones case reflects the prosecutor’s response to losing
the appeal and his updated decision to plea bargain. A Bayesian
approach can incorporate assigned probabilities that can be based
on actual data or, as in Table 1, on “invent[ed] numbers” in order
to illustrate how such changes or updating can be measured.67
Table 1 uses such estimates because actual data are presently dif-
ficult to access.
Examining Table 1, suppose there are two events at issue in
the Jones case: Event A, a murder conviction, and Event B, the
defense’s presentation in court of evidence of brain damage that
is probative of culpability. Suppose also that there is some infor-
mation about Event A that the prosecutor (the consumer of
Bayes’s Theorem) initially believes has a probability !(") of being
correct (the “prior” probability). In Jones, that information could
be the probability of a murder conviction among those defendants
charged with murder in New York State, which Table 1 estimates
is 50 percent. Suppose also that new evidence, #, is factored in,
which is the probability !(#) that the defense presents brain
damage evidence probative of culpability in any criminal trial in
New York State, which Table 1 estimates is 25 percent. Lastly,
suppose that there is a 15 percent probability !(#|") that the de-
fense presented brain damage evidence during trial given (or as-
suming) that the defendant was convicted of murder. The ques-
tion we would want to answer is what Bayesian theory calls the
“posterior” probability, that is, what is the probability ! " # of a
murder conviction among those defendants charged with murder
given (or assuming) that the defense presented relevant brain
damage evidence during trial?
65 Id.
66 See Kaplan, 20 Stan L Rev at 1078–82 (cited in note 23) (discussing the value of
compromise verdicts for a lesser included offense in criminal trials).
67 McGrayne, The Theory That Would Not Die at 6 (cited in note 28) (noting that
Bayes’s “ingenious solution” to finding data for his formula was this: “As a starting point
he would simply invent a number—he called it a guess—and refine it later as he gathered
more information.”).
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The Bayesian posterior probability will substantially differ
from the prior probability. More specifically, while the prosecutor
knows with certainty (!(#) = 1.0) that the defense will present
relevant brain damage evidence on retrial, the prosecutor does
not know what impact that evidence will have. Rather than gam-
ble on an acquittal, for example, the prosecutor accepts a plea
agreement. Expressed numerically in Table 1:
! "|# = ! #|" · !(")!(#) = (0.15) · (0.50)0.25 = 0.30 = 30%
The probability of a murder conviction in New York State in
cases in which the defense presents brain damage evidence pro-
bative of culpability during trial is substantially lower than in
those cases in which the defense did not present brain damage
evidence (30 percent compared to 50 percent). Therefore, it can be
argued that the defense’s ability to present brain damage evi-
dence probative of culpability updated the prosecutor’s prior be-
lief—that a jury could likely convict Jones of murder—to a poste-
rior belief that a jury could possibly acquit Jones. For that reason,
the prosecutor offered a compromise solution, enabling Jones to
plea bargain down to manslaughter.
Presumably, such an approach allows individuals to recalcu-
late the validity of their beliefs based on the best available evi-
dence, in this case, the more personalized and modern neuroim-
aging evidence. In theory, an individual’s initial beliefs about a
defendant’s behavior, plus new evidence, equals a new and im-
proved understanding. The more alternative explanations that
exist for the defendant’s behavior, the less plausible an individ-
ual’s initial beliefs may be until those alternative explanations no
longer make a difference. Applied in a legal context, a Bayesian
approach suggests that, if legal actors—such as judges, juries,
prosecutors, and defense attorneys—do not rigorously consider al-
ternative explanations for a defendant’s behavior, the best avail-
able evidence will simply confirm their initial belief even if that
belief was biased, uncertain, or ill-informed. In sum, Bayesian
statistics help individuals reduce their uncertainty through ra-
tional, calculated probabilities.68
68 See O’Reilly, Jbabdi, and Behrens, 35 Eur J Neuroscience at 1169 (cited in note 46).
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C. Neuroscientific Information
This Essay employs a Bayesian approach for several reasons.
First, there is evidence that such a probabilistic worldview is con-
sistent with how the human brain operates and the way that in-
dividuals try to make sense of their surroundings. All individuals
attempt to construct their beliefs about their circumstances by
interpreting the many competing and ambiguous signals that
they process continuously throughout every moment of their
lives. These constructions are based on an individual’s prior
knowledge, experiences, and beliefs in addition to any new infor-
mation and evidence that can update that person’s conclusions
and hypotheses.69 Defendants such as Jones, however, may be im-
paired in their ability to construct their beliefs because of their
cognitive deficiencies. As a result, their perceptions may not be
reasonable.
A probabilistic approach for assessing both reasonable and
unreasonable beliefs is especially appealing in the realm of neu-
roscientific evidence as it relates to environmental and sociologi-
cal factors. For example, enhanced personalization can help coun-
ter the simplistic, all-or-nothing assumptions about neuroscience
in court cases70 because it brings in many different types of neu-
roscience tests and measures that may be relevant in a particular
case, as Part IV of this Essay demonstrates with criminal de-
fenses. These measures include an extensive range of variables
concerning a defendant’s neighborhood, early trauma, and home
life, which are extremely important influences on human behav-
ior. Separately and interactively, cumulative probabilities of all
these variables help to explain a particular result or behavior ra-
ther than allow neuroscience alone to carry exclusive or even
maximal weight. Bayesian analysis is a particularly fruitful way
of individualizing criminal law.
Next, Bayesian Theory can override other kinds of wrong-
headed theories that courts rely on when they are evaluating neu-
roscientific evidence. For example, a substantial number of courts
turn to a “double-edged sword” analysis when deciding the admis-
sibility of a neuroscientific test or argument.71 Such an analysis
assumes that the defendant’s brain is “too broken” and the de-
fendant “too dangerous to have at large,” even if he is “somehow
69 See Kording, 25 Current Op in Neurobiology at 130–33 (cited in note 46).
70 See Denno, 56 BC L Rev at 496–99 (cited in note 22).
71 See id at 529–31.
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less culpable.”72 The double-edged approach also mistakenly be-
lieves that neuroscientific evidence will either get defendants off
the hook entirely or inaccurately paint them as an undeterred
danger to society. Yet there seems to be no basis for such an un-
derstanding, especially when the defense nearly always wants to
present the evidence and the prosecution nearly always wants to
exclude it.73 With rare exceptions, for both sides, the evidence is
typically considered mitigating and works to the defendant’s ben-
efit or else has no impact whatsoever.74
A Bayesian emphasis on alternative hypotheses and im-
proved beliefs balances out a common approach, taken by the
Jones trial court, to cap the amount of evidence to be considered
in any one case. In Jones, the trial court determined that the non-
imaging tests were sufficient indicators of Jones’s level of cogni-
tive impairment. In contrast, the defense successfully argued on
appeal that the results of MRI and CT testing would introduce a
more refined understanding of Jones’s mental challenges. Exclud-
ing this imaging evidence eliminated one of the most reliable in-
dicators of Jones’s condition and perhaps an entirely new expla-
nation for his behavior (or at least an improved one). The
prosecution’s ultimate decision to plea bargain in Jones’s case
likely reflected some concern that a jury may view the MRI and
CT scan evidence as mitigating or, at the very least, that the pros-
ecution did not want to take that chance.
Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, a Bayesian approach
can help cut through the Gordian Knot that grips neuroscience
debates academically and filters into the real world of litigation.
Is criminal behavior based on free will or determinism? Should
neuroscience be viewed through the eyes of philosophers or scien-
tists, defense attorneys or prosecutors? If scientists, from which
fields? These questions recognize the vast tugs-of-war between
psychologists, physicians, and neuroscientists and the training,
beliefs, interpretations, causal presumptions, biases, and test-
ing that each field brings with it. How large a role does or should
neuroscience play in the criminal justice system? Is the evidence
72 Jones and Shen, Law and Neuroscience in the United States at 362 (cited in note
15) (discussing the particularly misplaced assumptions about neuroscience in the death
penalty context) (emphasis omitted).
73 See Denno, 56 BC L Rev at 496–99 (cited in note 22) (discussing the pervasive
influence of the double-edged sword analogy in court cases).
74 Id at 543–44.
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undeservingly pronounced or insufficiently recognized, and how
broad should the parameters be for its relevance?
Such legal and interdisciplinary debates are beyond this
Essay’s scope, and they have been thoroughly discussed else-
where.75 Yet while they are critically important to understanding
the links between neuroscience and law, they can also mire the
examination of neuroscientific evidence in real cases, in which the
issues require not weighty musings but quick resolution. After all,
an appeal of Bayesian Theory is its capacity to deal with uncer-
tainty—which is also the reigning framework for law and neuro-
science debates. We now know far more about what explains hu-
man behavior than we ever have, but more questions remain than
anyone can definitively answer.
D. Normative Questions and Criticisms
The use of probability analysis in legal cases is not new, of
course. Nor is Bayesian theory new to law, although its impact
has been far vaster in other fields. In 1968, Professor John Kaplan
introduced the application of a Bayesian approach to law and en-
hanced personalization in a discussion of the virtues of subjectiv-
ity and a “personalistic definition of probability [whereby] differ-
ent people may have different ideas about the probability of the
same event.”76 Others would follow, including Professor Laurence
Tribe’s torrid criticisms of the Bayesian approach.77 Tribe stressed
that the application of Bayes’s Theorem to the trial process can
often be, at best, limited, and, at worst, distortive and error-
ridden. He noted that the approach conflicted with other values
that the legal system serves and made the “system seem even
more alien and inhuman than it already” appeared.78 Indeed,
other legal commentators have emphasized that “classical statis-
tical methods,” over Bayesian theory, have been the more popular
choice for analyzing legal proceedings and problems.79
75 For an excellent overview of many of these conflicts—regardless of which sides a
reader may take, see generally Alces, The Moral Conflict of Law and Neuroscience (cited
in note 47).
76 Kaplan, 20 Stan L Rev at 1067 (cited in note 23).
77 See generally Tribe, 84 Harv L Rev 1329 (cited in note 57) (providing a negative
view of a Bayesian approach in law). But see generally Finkelstein and Fairley, 83 Harv
L Rev 489 (cited in note 57) (providing a positive view of a Bayesian approach in law).
78 Tribe, 84 Harv L Rev at 1376 (cited in note 57).
79 See, for example, Norman Fenton, Martin Neil, and Daniel Berger, Bayes and the
Law, 3 Ann Rev Statistics & Application 51, 52 (2016).
2019] Neuroscience and the Personalization of Criminal Law 379
Perhaps the most recognized critique comes from Professors
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s famous article on subjec-
tive probability—which assailed the Bayesian approach80—as
well as Kahneman’s further criticisms in his book, Thinking, Fast
and Slow.81 While this body of work is beyond this Essay’s scope,
it bears emphasizing that critics of Kahneman have challenged
both the veracity and replicability of some of the key research on
which he relied in his critiques of the Bayesian approach, as well
as his assertions on their merits.82
Indeed, Kaplan’s original article reminds us that the applica-
bility of a Bayesian approach to the criminal justice system does
not need to meet the same expectations as the hard sciences and
that probabilities are a greater indication of the truth than intu-
ition. The surge in use of a Bayesian approach in recent years in
80 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judge of
Representativeness, 3 Cognitive Psychology 430, 449–52 (1972).
81 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow 169, 173–74 (Farrar, Straus and
Giroux 2011).
82 Kahneman suggests that reflexively formed cognitive biases can inhibit deliberate
rational reasoning, hence the title of his book. See generally id. Critics dispute his notion
of irrationality and have suggested that information presented in certain formats allows
humans to reason through their own biases. See David R. Mandel, The Psychology of
Bayesian Reasoning, 5 Frontiers in Psychology 1, 1–2 (Oct 2014); Gerd Gigerenzer and
Ulrich Hoffrage, How to Improve Bayesian Reasoning without Instruction: Frequency
Formats, 102 Psychological Rev 684, 700 (1995). Humans can exhibit this capability from
a very young age. See David M. Sobel, Joshua B. Tenenbaum, and Alison Gopnik,
Children’s Causal Inferences from Indirect Evidence: Backwards Blocking and Bayesian
Reasoning in Preschoolers, 28 Cognitive Science 303, 330 (2004) (finding that children as
young as four years old demonstrated reasoning consistent with a Bayesian model of cog-
nition when confronted with basic sight-puzzles).
In addition, Kahneman’s findings support the notion of priming, which suggests that
unassuming stimuli can unconsciously affect thoughts and actions; this area of research,
however, has recently suffered from a crisis of replication. See Alison Abbott, Disputed
Results a Fresh Blow for Social Psychology, 497 Nature 16, 16 (May 2, 2013) (reporting
that Kahneman himself has challenged researchers to be more careful in replicating prim-
ing studies). The turmoil is due, in part, to academic scandal, as at least one prominent
scholar in the area was implicated in a 2012 case of research fraud at Dutch universities.
See Daniel Engber, The Irony Effect: How the Scientist Who Founded the Science of
Mistakes Ended Up Mistaken (Slate, Dec 21, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/L2T7
-PLJL (noting that, while Kahneman’s research did not face questions of integrity, one
scholar in the area was accused of falsifying results while another foundational theory in
the field of priming was widely debunked); Ulrich Schimmack, Moritz Heene, and Kamini
Kesavan, Reconstruction of a Train Wreck: How Priming Research Went off the Rails
(Replicability-Index, Feb 2, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/KU5S-JP59 (quantifying
concerns on replicability and noting that findings on priming should not be construed as
scientific evidence). Kahneman responded to Schimmack, Heene, and Kesavan in the com-
ments to their piece, stating that he “put too much faith in underpowered studies.”
Schimmack, Heene, and Kesavan, Reconstruction of a Train Wreck (cited in note 82).
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a broad range of disciplines,83 as well as its suggested application
to neuroscientific information in particular,84 provides a more
modern perspective on current thinking.
Most significantly, a Bayesian approach is an effective vehi-
cle for allowing a decisionmaker to consider a wide array of infor-
mation about a defendant in the context of a personalistic theory
of probability.85 This focus raises normative considerations and
two questions in particular that pertain specifically to neurosci-
entific evidence: If presenting more neuroscientific evidence
makes P(A|B) less than P(A) by a certain margin, shouldn’t
courts favor admitting such evidence rather than excluding it?
This question is different from the basic question of whether such
evidence is probative and not unduly prejudicial because some
courts will exclude neuroscientific evidence if they think it simply
will not be necessary, regardless of whether it is prejudicial.
If presenting more neuroscientific evidence reduces the level
of initial “prior” bias that a judge or jury may have toward or
against a defendant for nonlegal reasons (for example, race),
shouldn’t courts favor admitting neuroscientific evidence rather
than excluding it? This question is especially important in light
of research indicating a strong degree of implicit bias on the parts
of judges, juries, and other legal actors.86
These questions go to the core of the overlap between person-
alization and the clarifying effect of Bayesian updates because a
probabilistic approach allows for greater individualization of the
court’s treatment of a defendant. They also highlight the utility
of a probabilistic approach in circumstances in which personali-
zation is especially important, such as the use of neuroscientific
evidence in criminal defenses.
III. A PERSONALIZED APPROACH TO DEFENSES
In my Neuroscience Study, the intersection between neurosci-
ence, social and environmental factors, and criminal law overlaps
perhaps most pointedly at criminal law defenses. There, defense
attorneys rely on the science either to diminish culpability and
83 See, for example, Fenton, Neil, and Berger, 3 Ann Rev Statistics & Application at 52–
53 (cited in note 79); Klarreich, 58 Communications of the ACM at 21–22 (cited in note 56).
84 See, for example, Kording, 25 Current Op in Neurobiology at 131–32 (cited in note
46); O’Reilly, Jbabdi, and Behrens, 35 Eur J Neuroscience at 1172–78 (cited in note 46).
85 See Kaplan, 20 Stan L Rev at 1067 (cited in note 23).
86 See, for example, Jerry Kang, et al, Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L
Rev 1124, 1135–50 (2012) (analyzing the extensive research on implicit bias).
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therefore mitigate the sentence (as in Jones) or to suggest that
the defendant was so incompetent or insane that he could not un-
derstand the nature of his thoughts or actions. The following
Sections focus on the use of Bayesian Theory as a normative
model and how courts can—and sometimes already do—incorpo-
rate neuroscientific evidence and a personalized approach.
A. The Defense of Dismissing or Diminishing the Defendant’s
Level of Mens Rea
The Neuroscience Study found that a common tactic used by
defense attorneys is to argue that defendants did not have the
requisite mental state to commit the crimes for which they were
convicted; in other words, their mental state at the time of the
crime was below the legal requirement (a lesser mens rea) be-
cause of some kind of cognitive deficiency. Jones’s contention that
his cognitive injuries impaired his ability to form an intent to kill
Hardaway is a variant of this tactic. Therefore, Jones argued, he
did not deserve a murder conviction but rather a charge more fit-
ting with his diminished culpability, such as manslaughter.
In my Neuroscience Study, eighty-one lesser–mens rea cases
were divided into two categories, as Figure 1 shows: (1) thirty-
nine capital cases and (2) forty-two noncapital cases. Because I
have examined the thirty-nine capital cases elsewhere,87 the dis-
cussion here focuses on the noncapital cases, although compari-
sons between the two categories are helpful because courts fail to
provide clear guidelines for both types of cases, and they have
many parallels. The lesser–mens rea defenses for both categories
(capital and noncapital) were also comparably successful,
although slightly more so for noncapital cases. For example, in
the thirty-nine capital cases, ten defendants—or one-quarter
(25.64 percent)—were successful; in the forty-two noncapital
cases, thirteen defendants—or nearly one-third (30.95 percent)—
were successful. Success was defined as defendants winning an
argument for a lesser mens rea, thereby reversing their convic-
tions or sentences on appeal.
Whether a lesser–mens rea case is successful may be based
in part on a personalized Bayesian perspective—specifically, the
opportunities that defendants have to present to triers of fact al-
ternative explanations and hypotheses for their lesser mens rea.
The vagueness of the mens rea categories—as well as the nature
87 Denno, 85 Fordham L Rev at 461–72 (cited in note 49).
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and extent of the neuroscientific and socio-environmental varia-
bles that may also be relevant—invite a wide variety of interpre-
tations of what a defendant was thinking. Furthermore, the evi-
dence and testing can vary enormously.88
In People v Cegers,89 for example, the defendant “was con-
victed of assault with a deadly weapon, use of a dangerous and
deadly weapon, and intentional infliction of great bodily injury.”90
However, because the trial court concluded there were mitigating
circumstances, it chose a lower sentence of just two years in
prison.91 Yet the defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court
erred by excluding expert testimony related to his brain function-
ing.92 The appellate court agreed.93
The defendant’s principal contention on appeal was that the
trial court should have allowed expert testimony related to sleep
disorders that, the defendant alleged, influenced his behavior and
negated his intent.94 According to the Court of Appeal, exclusion
of expert testimony that the defendant suffered from “confusional
arousal syndrome” was reversible error.95 Confusional arousal
syndrome is found in individuals suffering from sleep apnea and
who awaken during a state of depressed mental functioning.96
Due to a brain anomaly, such individuals can engage in motor
functions such as sleepwalking and sometimes “can be violent,
causing injury or death to others.”97 The expert evidence support-
ing the presence of this condition was extensive and raised a num-
ber of probabilistic associations that could be jointly or sequen-
tially incorporated into a Bayesian model—ranging from an
electroencephalogram (EEG) test, a sleep history, administration
of an all-night test of oxygen in defendant’s blood using an oxime-
ter test, and examination of the defendant’s breathing patterns.98
As the appellate court stressed, all of the testing was highly
personalized: “[T]he doctor’s approach was specific to [the defend-
ant], based upon a personal examination, the taking of a history,
88 See id at 455.
89 7 Cal App 4th 988 (1992).
90 Id at 990–91.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Cegers, 7 Cal App 4th at 991.
94 Id.
95 Id at 993–95.
96 Id at 993.
97 Cegers, 7 Cal App 4th at 993.
98 Id at 1000.
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the measuring of blood levels during sleep, and a consideration of
the unique facts of the assault.”99 In addition, the court viewed
these factors in terms of a probabilistic framework. As the court
explained, “It was, in fact, garden variety medical/psychological
testimony concerning the probable physiological defect to which
[the defendant] was subject, a defect that would affect his mental
state at the time of the assault.”100 Recognizing “the bizarre cir-
cumstances of the crime,” the court also applied probabilistic rea-
soning: “[I]t is at least reasonably probable that had the evidence
in question been admitted the defendant would not have been
found guilty.”101
B. The Defense of Insanity
The insanity defense has different parameters and expecta-
tions than a lesser–mens rea defense, and it would be expected
that the Bayesian events that define it would vary as well. For
example, the defense is highly controversial, rarely raised, and
notoriously difficult to prove.102 In my Neuroscience Study, how-
ever, the defense is a key component of cases using neuroscientific
evidence. As Figure 2 shows, altogether 93 of the Neuroscience
Study’s 553 defendant cases (17 percent) involved an insanity de-
fense.103 In about half of the insanity cases (forty-seven), the de-
fendant claimed he or she was insane due to a neurological disor-
der. In the remaining cases, the defendant pointed to other
causes, such as a psychiatric or mental illness (twenty-three
cases) or organic brain damage (twenty cases).
While all ninety-three cases involved neuroscientific evidence
in some way, seventy-one cases included some type of electrophys-
iological monitoring or neuroimaging, including EEG, MRI test-
ing, CT scans, and single-photon emission computed tomography
(SPECT) scans. Neuroimaging evidence was most commonly used
to support the presence of organic brain syndrome or organic
brain abnormalities (twenty-one cases). In addition, among the
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Cegers, 7 Cal App 4th at 1001.
102 See Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law at 317–18, 336–37 (cited in note 31).
103 In these ninety-three cases, most courts used two different types of insanity tests
to evaluate the defense: the M’Naghten Rule, which requires that the defendant did not
know the nature and quality of the act she committed as a result of a disease of the mind
or that, if she did know it, she did not know that what she was doing was wrong; and the MPC
Rule, which requires that the defendant lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the crimi-
nality of her conduct or to conform her conduct to the law’s requirements. Id at 346, 350.
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ninety-three defendants, fifty-four different types of diagnoses
were identified, the most common being substance abuse, depres-
sion, organic brain syndrome, personality disorder, and schizo-
phrenia. In addition, nineteen cases involved a malingering is-
sue—thirteen of which were directly related to the defendant’s
insanity plea. Notably, approximately one-half of the ninety-three
defendants (fifty-five) received the death penalty.
Some scholars have posited that neuroscientific evidence—as
opposed to historically used psychiatric evidence—would
heighten the likelihood of a successful insanity plea because the
evidence should be viewed as more convincing.104 Yet the
Neuroscience Study did not necessarily find such a difference. In
only two of the ninety-three cases did the court rule in favor of a
defendant who had asserted an insanity defense; in both cases,
the defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity. In three
cases, an appeals court ruled in favor of a defendant who claimed
ineffective assistance of counsel for reasons related to an insanity
defense. Finally, in one case, the defendant’s conviction and sen-
tence were reversed due to a procedural error that prejudiced the
defendant’s ability to argue his insanity defense. In eighty-seven
cases, then, the court ruled in favor of the prosecution and the
defendant was convicted, or the conviction or sentence were re-
versed or remanded for reasons unrelated to an insanity defense.
An examination of Dixon v State,105 one of the two cases in
which the court ruled in favor of the defendants’ claim of insanity,
suggests that an insanity defense succeeds when there are seem-
ingly no alternative hypotheses whatsoever—zero probability—to
explain why a court would not find a defendant insane. When
viewed through the lens of a Bayesian approach, then, the range
of probabilistic updates for a trier of fact would be highly limited.
In Dixon, the defendant was convicted of the attempted murder
104 See, for example, N.J. Schweitzer and Michael J. Saks, Neuroimage Evidence and
the Insanity Defense, 29 Behav Sci & L 592, 594 (2011):
[The] concern is that, when jurors are able to “see” the source of behavior in the
image of a malfunctioning brain, they will be substantially more persuaded than
they have been by traditional forms of testimony such as behavioral descriptions
by lay or expert witnesses or explanations of the behavior offered by psycholog-
ical and psychiatric experts.
See also, for example, Joseph Dumit, Objective Brains, Prejudicial Images, 12 Sci in Context
173, 194–98 (1999).
105 668 S2d 65 (Ala Crim App 1994).
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of a police officer and sentenced to twenty years in prison.106 Fol-
lowing the attempt, she was committed to a hospital for treatment
because she was found incompetent to stand trial.107 Although she
was then given medications in order to become competent to
stand trial, she appealed her conviction and sentence, claiming
that the evidence of her insanity was overwhelming, that she had
overcome the presumption of sanity, and that she should be ac-
quitted. The appellate court agreed.108
The evidence on the appellant’s side was extensive. According
to an expert’s interpretation of her CT scan, at the time of the
alleged offense, the appellant evidenced “a psychotic delusional
disorder” in which her “thought processes were severely impaired
. . . to the extent that she was unable to rationally evaluate and
appreciate either her own actions or those of others.”109 Subse-
quently, “as a result of a severe mental disease or defect [the ap-
pellant] was unable to appreciate the nature and quality of the
wrongfulness of her acts”—essentially satisfying the require-
ments of the M’Naghten insanity test.110 Additional evidence fol-
lowed, such as a stream of prior hospital records, including psy-
chological test results, a social and family history, and a drug test,
as well as testimony from a number of doctors affirming the basis
of the appellant’s delusional disorder.111
While the appellant was able to act “normally” at other times,
in general she “could not function rationally.”112 The doctor who
also interpreted the appellant’s CT scan testified that the appel-
lant “really thought she was in danger” from the police officer and
“was convinced that what she was doing [to the officer] was ap-
propriate and necessary.”113 Important to the court, and to the
value of neuroscientific evidence generally, was the fact that the
expert’s “opinion about the appellant’s mental state was not based
primarily on the appellant’s description of her own symptoms”114
but rather on all of the other evidence that was independent of
her control; this included “voluminous records outlining the
106 Id at 65.
107 Id at 66–67.
108 Id.
109 Dixon, 668 S2d at 67.
110 Id.
111 Id at 68.
112 Id.
113 Dixon, 668 S2d at 68.
114 Id at 71.
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nearly identical conclusions of four other mental health profes-
sionals that the appellant was psychotic.”115 Indeed, the court’s
view accentuates the significance of neuroscientific evidence on
many levels, not the least of which was to show that the defendant
was not malingering about her condition. Perhaps most signifi-
cantly, “[T]here was ‘nothing before the jury to rebut the great
mass of testimony directly showing actual insanity before, at the
time of, and after the act in question.’”116 As the court emphasized,
“[T]here were simply no facts from which opposing inferences
might have been rationally drawn.”117
The insanity defense, then, is particularly restrictive in terms
of enabling the defense to present alternative hypotheses. Like
Jones, it is helpful to examine a case like Dixon according to a
Bayesian formula to illustrate the extent of these constraints.
Suppose the two events at issue in the Dixon case are Event A, a
person who is able to understand right from wrong, and Event B,
a person who has a specific brain abnormality, such as frontal
lobe damage. The next step would be to establish the “prior” prob-
ability, that is, suppose that there is some information about
Event A that the trier of fact initially believes has a probability!(") of being correct. Let’s assume that !(") is the probability of
any given person being able to understand right from wrong,
which this example estimates to be 95 percent. Suppose also that
new evidence, #, is factored in; this example estimates the prob-
ability !(#) of a person having frontal lobe damage to be 10 per-
cent. The question then becomes, what is the probability of a per-
son understanding right from wrong given frontal lobe damage?
Suppose, for example, there is a 5 percent probability !(#|")
of frontal lobe damage given that the person knows right from
wrong. The question we would want to answer is the Bayesian
“posterior” probability, that is, what is the probability ! " # of a
person knowing right or wrong given (or assuming) that the per-
son has frontal lobe damage? If the trier of fact’s Bayesian updating
has occurred, the posterior probability will substantially differ
from the prior probability. Expressed numerically, the formula is:
115 Id at 72.
116 Id, quoting Herbert v State, 357 S2d 683, 689 (Ala Crim App 1978).
117 Dixon, 668 S2d at 72, quoting Herbert, 357 S2d at 689.
2019] Neuroscience and the Personalization of Criminal Law 387
! "|# = ! #|" · !(")!(#) = (0.05) · (0.95)0.10 = 0.475 = 47.50%
In this example, the probability of a person understanding
right from wrong given frontal lobe damage is about half as likely
as in those circumstances in which the person does not have
frontal lobe damage (47.5 percent relative to 95 percent). There-
fore, it can be argued that the defense’s presentation of a defend-
ant’s frontal lobe damage should be considered mitigating when
the defendant is compared to the rest of the population. A compa-
rable type of analysis could be applied to the defense of incompe-
tency to stand trial given that incompetency and insanity often
draw from the same pool of defendants.
C. The Defense of Incompetency
In the criminal context, a defendant’s competence is required
in order to move forward with standard court procedures. Alto-
gether, as Figure 3 shows, my Neuroscience Study found that
sixty-seven cases involved a competency issue. More than half of
these cases focused on the question of whether the defendant was
competent to stand trial (forty cases), while the others addressed
alternative concerns. Yet in only eleven (16.41 percent) of the
sixty-seven cases did the court find a reasonable doubt as to the
defendant’s competency.
In almost half of the competency cases, the defendant claimed
he or she was incompetent due to organic brain damage (twenty-
seven cases). The remaining cases’ claims relied on head trauma
or brain injury, psychiatric or mental illness, neurological disor-
der or impairment, or mental retardation. In addition, nineteen
cases noted the possibility of a malingering defendant: strikingly,
courts held in more than half of those cases (eleven) that defend-
ants were malingering or feigning an illness.
Over half of the sixty-seven cases (thirty-eight cases or
57 percent) used electrophysiological monitoring (such as EEG
tests) or neuroimaging (such as MRI and CT scans). While neu-
roimaging was most commonly employed to support the presence
of a brain injury or brain damage (twenty-two cases), it was also
often employed to undermine the presence of such abnormalities,
typically with a finding that a defendant’s brain was normal.
At the same time, neuroimaging appeared to be a significant
factor in competency determinations. Examining these cases
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shows some of the personalized information that was involved. In
four (18.18 percent) of the twenty-two cases in which neuroimag-
ing supported the presence of a disorder or brain damage, the
court found a reasonable doubt of competency. For example, in
Maxwell v State,118 an MRI revealed that the defendant had a rare
and severe form of multiple sclerosis that caused lesions on his
brain, affecting his mental condition.119 When the trial court was
presented with this evidence, it acknowledged that the defendant
was incompetent.120 In United States v Duncan,121 standby counsel
produced results from MRI and positron emission tomography
(PET) scans showing that the defendant possessed an unusual
brain structure.122 The defense-appointed experts contended that
the defendant’s brain dysfunction contributed to a severe psycho-
sis that “render[ed] him unable to have a rational understanding
of the proceedings or to waive his right to counsel and to represent
himself.”123 While the court-appointed experts disagreed, the
court held that the evidence was enough to create a reasonable
doubt of competency.124 In State v Marshall,125 the defendant was
given MRI, EEG, and SPECT scans, which all showed, according
to the defense expert, “[c]lear evidence of brain damage.”126 The
court referred to the neuroimaging evidence, which demonstrated
serious brain damage, in determining that there was enough evi-
dence to raise a reasonable doubt of competency.127
Lastly, in United States v Sampson,128 the court found that
counsel should have pursued a competency hearing given evi-
dence of the defendant’s mental illness.129 An MRI and a PET scan
showed evidence that the defendant suffered from organic brain
damage.130 Yet in the other seven of the eleven cases that involved
a finding of a reasonable doubt of competency, neuroimaging was
not used. These results thereby support the Neuroscience Study’s
contention that collecting a pool of cases that simply look at brain
118 974 S2d 505 (Fla App 2008).
119 Id at 507.
120 Id at 510.
121 643 F3d 1242 (9th Cir 2011).
122 Id at 1249.
123 Id.
124 Id at 1250.
125 27 P3d 192 (Wash 2001).
126 Id at 196.
127 Id at 199.
128 820 F Supp 2d 202 (D Mass 2011).
129 Id at 246–47.
130 Id at 243.
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scans leaves out a substantial portion of brain-injured individuals
who never have the benefit of neuroimaging.
D. The Defense of Diminished Capacity
There is no generally accepted legal definition of “diminished
capacity”; instead, “courts have employed the concept of dimin-
ished capacity in two fundamentally different ways in the deter-
mination of guilt.”131 First, courts use diminished capacity “as a
basis for admitting evidence concerning the defendant’s mental
disease, defect, condition or abnormality at the time of the offense
to show that the defendant lacked or possessed the required men-
tal state for the crime.”132 Second, courts employ diminished ca-
pacity “as a basis for mitigating the seriousness of an offense, be-
cause of the defendant’s mental disease, defect, condition or
abnormality at the time of the crime, in order to render him or
her guilty of a less serious offense.”133 As in Jones, the evidence
could reduce what would otherwise be a murder conviction to
manslaughter, or it could be introduced as a mitigating factor in
sentencing.134
In the Neuroscience Study, as Figure 4 shows, seventy cases
involved diminished capacity as a defense or as a basis for miti-
gating an offense or sentence. In twenty-seven cases, diminished
capacity was raised during the guilt phase of the trial, and in
twelve cases it was raised during the sentencing phase. Most of
these cases (fifty) involved a situation in which diminished capac-
ity was raised as a mitigating factor. However, in other cases
(twenty-four), the defense used diminished capacity to argue that
the defendant lacked the requisite mental state necessary for the
crime. Altogether, sixty of the seventy defendants were given the
death penalty.
In twenty-five of the seventy cases (35.71 percent), neuroim-
aging or electrophysiological monitoring was used, which predom-
inantly involved major tests, such as MRI and EEG. Neuroimag-
ing was most often employed to support a claim of an organic
brain syndrome or abnormality as a mitigating factor. Notably, in
131 David M. Siegel, The Defense of Diminished Capacity, in Robert Cipes, Sidney
Bernstein, and Irwin Hall, 1B Criminal Defense Techniques § 32.01(1)(e) (Matthew Bender
& Co 2018).
132 Id. See also Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law at 343 (cited in note 31).
133 Siegel, The Defense of Diminished Capacity § 32.01(1)(e) (cited in note 131). See
also Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law at 344 (cited in note 31).
134 See Siegel, The Defense of Diminished Capacity § 32.01(1)(a) (cited in note 131).
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twenty-one of the seventy cases (30 percent), the defendant as-
serted a successful claim that related to a diminished capacity ar-
gument or defense in some way. Of those twenty-one cases, there
were fifteen in which the court ruled in favor of the defendant’s
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
In Odle v Calderon,135 for example, the defendant, James
Odle, was convicted of first degree murder of two different people,
including a police officer, after he had been drinking and had
taken lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD).136 He brought forth an in-
effective assistance of counsel claim, which he won on appeal
based on his counsel’s failure to present expert testimony at trial
related to Odle’s mental condition and statutory mitigating fac-
tors.137 The court noted that Odle underwent an EEG test.138 Even
though the exact results from the EEG were not discussed in the
district court’s opinion, it was implied that the results reflected
evidence of Odle’s brain damage.139 The court also noted that
Odle’s mental deficiency was not subtle—Odle was “missing a
piece of his brain the size of a grapefruit” and his brain deficits
were obvious.140 The EEG results corroborated expert and lay wit-
ness testimony related to Odle’s erratic behavior and brain disor-
ders as well as Odle’s mental health records, which indicated that
Odle had undergone a lobectomy some time before he committed
the charged offense.141
Evidence showed that Odle’s mental deficiencies commenced
in 1973 when he was in a car accident and experienced “severe
trauma to his brain.”142 As a result, a surgeon “performed a tem-
poral lobe lobectomy, removing a 3 x 3 x 4 inch piece of his brain
. . . [but leaving] just a flap of skin to cover the opening in [Odle’s]
skull.”143 The surgeon chose to close the opening only when Odle
came back over a year later to complain “that his brain was pul-
sating beneath the skin.”144 The defense expert who administered
135 919 F Supp 1367 (ND Cal 1996).
136 People v Odle, 754 P2d 184, 187 (Cal 1988).
137 Odle v Woodford, 238 F3d 1084, 1089 (9th Cir 2001).
138 Id at 1088.
139 See id.
140 Id at 1089.
141 Odle, 238 F3d at 1087–88.
142 Id at 1087.
143 Id.
144 Id.
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one of the EEGs noted that the results “revealed brain abnormal-
ities consistent with an epileptic seizure disorder.”145 The expert
“testified that Odle’s brain injury would probably cause behav-
ioral disturbances beyond his control,” a diagnosis that “was con-
sistent with Odle’s complaints, documented during his hospitali-
zations, that he often felt unable to control his impulses.”146 While
Odle was originally determined to be competent to stand trial,
that finding was reversed, and Odle and his lawyers continue to
litigate the case.
This kind of evidence in Odle was powerful mitigation be-
cause of the alternative explanations and hypotheses that it could
have provided had the trial attorney introduced it. Presumably, a
jury without such evidence would have viewed Odle’s violent con-
duct in an entirely different way that would have been far less
mitigating.
IV. WHO SHOULD BE USING A BAYESIAN APPROACH AND WHY
Discussions of Bayesian Theory in the context of personaliza-
tion should consider who should be using the approach and why.
These factors determine the kinds of events, variables, and as-
signed probabilities that a model (like Table 1) should incorpo-
rate. In the context of criminal law defenses, for example, there
could be an array of users or consumers—judges, juries, prosecu-
tors, or defense attorneys. While neuroscientific information gen-
erally is becoming more precise, so far there are only estimates, if
that, about its prevalence in certain populations. That said, a
Bayesian approach accommodates this uncertainty through a
probabilistic analysis of particular characteristics that are asso-
ciated with personalization in the criminal justice system, such
as a defendant’s culpability and cognitive capacity.
A. The Question of Why
A more pertinent question is: Why use a Bayesian approach?
This Essay’s discussion of criminal defenses shows that attempts
to personalize defendants employing neuroscientific evidence
generally—much less through Bayesian updating—could over-
whelm judges and jurors with too many bits of information and
tax an already complicated proceeding. Indeed, recent evidence
showing the extent of individuals’ heuristic biases might limit the
145 Odle, 238 F3d at 1088.
146 Id.
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ability of some criminal justice consumers to adjust rationally in
a Bayesian manner. Some may argue that they would be way too
stuck on their priors. Events at the scene of a crime and the de-
fendant’s actions—not to mention extralegal factors like race—
can also inappropriately dominate consumers’ depictions about
mens rea or the personalized factors that influence it. Others may
contend that the advantage of a Bayesian approach is that it high-
lights information that would otherwise get lost in the litigation
scuffle—especially personalized information about the defendant
that triers of fact could overlook when presented with other kinds
of variables that may be more heuristically appealing.
Commentators recognize that there will always be subjective
judgments involved in a Bayesian approach, such as selecting the
confidence level a consumer would use to make a decision as well
as the questions that consumers want answered. That said, the
resurgent interest in Bayesian thinking is based in part on the
growing recognition that inroads in computational design have
greatly enhanced the “methods for calculating numerical approx-
imations to high-level dimensional integrals [that have] ‘liberated
Bayesian inference, and made it much more prominent.’”147 In-
deed, in some ways, this Essay’s call for a Bayesian approach is
also a call for more research and data collection on neuroscientific
information, including surveys, in an effort to better construct
probabilities and refine estimates.
This Essay also promotes a Bayesian approach to convey the
general idea that the rational way for consumers to deal with a
defendant’s neuroscientific—and more personalized—infor-
mation is to update their priors based on more information. Es-
sentially, triers of fact should be given the benefit of Bayes’s
Theorem by having more personalized information accessible to
them. We know the probabilistic thresholds that jurors are sup-
posed to reach—beyond a reasonable doubt or preponderance of
the evidence, for example—and Bayesian updating allows jurors
to more accurately implement those standards. If there is neuro-
scientific evidence about defendants that can move triers of fact
in one direction or the other, then the system should err on the
side of including it. Can this proposal of inclusion cut both ways
in terms of benefitting both the prosecution and the defense? It
could, but that possibility is the risk of accepting the premise of
Bayesian updating and the reach for more data.
147 Klarreich, 58 Communications of the ACM at 23 (cited in note 56).
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The criminal law provides a valuable context for considering
the use of neuroscientific evidence to improve criminal justice.
First and foremost, the application of neuroscientific evidence in
criminal cases is an essential aspect of protecting individual
rights. The criminal law emphasizes the mental state of the hu-
man mind in a way that the civil law does not, and the stakes of
a guilty verdict are higher. Yet the process of investigating, intro-
ducing, and challenging neuroscientific evidence within the pa-
rameters of a criminal courtroom is costly. Many of the criminal
cases in the Neuroscience Study’s database include a host of ex-
perts for both the prosecution and the defense. Further analysis
of the Neuroscience Study’s data will enable an evidence-based
assessment of the involvement of such experts, with the goal of
developing a fairer and more cost-efficient system to address the
needs of defendants for whom neuroscientific evidence is most
relevant.
B. The Problem of Funding
The funding of testing and experts is an issue that arises in
many criminal cases, and it pertains to a wide swath of evidence,
irrespective of whether it involves neuroscience. That said, as
Figure 5 shows, my Neuroscience Study found that 89 of the 553
defendant cases (16.09 percent) specifically raised the matter of
funding for neuroscientific evidence. In all eighty-nine cases, the
defense submitted a funding request. There were no cases in
which the prosecution made a formal request for funding and no
references to the court allotting a specific amount of funding to
the prosecution.148 Altogether, seventy of the eighty-nine cases
(nearly 80 percent) started out as capital cases, an unsurprising
result given the high stakes involved in such cases.
Of the eighty-nine funding cases, there were thirty-four cases
in which funding was requested for imaging; in twelve of those
thirty-four cases (35.29 percent), the funding request was
granted. In addition, there were twenty-two cases in which fund-
ing was requested for nonneuroimaging testing; in ten of those
twenty-two cases (45.45 percent), the funding request was
granted. Lastly, there were sixty-seven cases in which funding
was requested to hire an expert and/or furnish expert testimony;
148 However, there were several cases in which the prosecution moved for a particular
test or evaluation to be performed.
394 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:359
notably, in forty-six cases of those sixty-seven cases (68.66 per-
cent), the funding request was granted.
It is difficult to thoroughly investigate the role of funding be-
cause so little has been written about this issue. Whether neuro-
scientific evidence requests are being treated more generously
relative to other types of evidence is unknown because there is no
other study or documentation available for comparison. Typically,
the court lumps together all requested testing and treats it as a
composite. Regardless, an overview of the eighty-nine cases is help-
ful in determining how legislatures and courts distribute the money
allotted for defense attorney requests for experts and testing.
For example, Figure 5 shows that the most common type of
funding request was for hiring an expert and/or furnishing expert
testimony, followed by requests for imaging testing, and lastly,
requests for nonimaging testing. Additionally, it appears that
funding requests made for experts are more likely to be granted
by courts than requests for imaging or nonimaging testing. Nota-
bly, funding requests for imaging tests are the least likely to be
granted. Presumably, the high cost involved in neuroimaging
testing is one explanation for the difficulty in receiving court
funding for it, although it is not at all clear that it is truly among
the most expensive requests. Not surprisingly, claims of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel were behind many of the funding re-
quests. In total, fifty-three of the eighty-nine funding cases
(59.55 percent) involved at least one ineffective assistance of
counsel claim. Interestingly, there were only two cases in which
at least one ineffective assistance of counsel claim was specifically
based on counsel’s alleged failure to obtain funding from the state.
A common argument about neuroscientific evidence in crimi-
nal cases is that there will not be sufficient funds to cover the
tests and experts involved. The Neuroscience Study suggests that
funding problems may not be as pronounced as is commonly as-
sumed. That said, most of the funding requests do not pertain to
neuroimaging tests but rather to experts generally. While the two
may be related (the experts are necessary to interpret the imag-
ing), until further information is gathered, it is presumptuous to
conclude that inequality in funding is a reason for attorneys not
to request neuroscientific testing, even if it is relevant.
CONCLUSION
This Essay contends that a criminal justice system that is
more personalized would likely be more effective, efficient, and
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fair and that incorporating neuroscience into the factfinding pro-
cess is a particularly apt vehicle for enhancing personalization.
While the greater influx of personalization may raise concerns by
some that the criminal justice system may be unable to regulate
punishment appropriately, a probabilistic framework is one way
to sidestep these potential problems. Bayes’s Theorem is particu-
larly geared toward enhancing personalization and diminishing
heuristic biases that legal actors are apt to possess. Likewise,
both personalization and a Bayesian approach can help promote
a criminal justice system that not only protects society from crime
but also punishes criminals at the level of their blameworthiness.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1: APPLICATION OF BAYES THEOREM TO PEOPLE V JONES
Equation: ! "|# = ) *|+ ·)(+))(*) = (,..1)·(,.1,),.>1 = 0.30 = 30%
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FIGURE 1: CHARACTERISTICS OF LESSER MENS REA DEFENSES
(BY NUMBER OF CASES)*
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FIGURE 2: CHARACTERISTICS OF INSANITY DEFENSES
(BY NUMBER OF CASES)*
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FIGURE 3: CHARACTERISTICS OF INCOMPETENCY DEFENSES
(BY NUMBER OF CASES)*
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FIGURE 4: CHARACTERISTICS OF DIMINISHED CAPACITY
DEFENSES (BY NUMBER OF CASES)*
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FIGURE 5: FUNDING ISSUES, REQUESTS AND GRANTS
(BY NUMBER OF CASES)*
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